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Abstract
The AGI alignment problem has a bimodal distribution of outcomes with most outcomes clustering around the poles
of total success and existential, catastrophic failure. Consequently, attempts to solve AGI alignment should, all else
equal, prefer false negatives (ignoring research programs that would have been successful) to false positives (pursu-
ing research programs that will unexpectedly fail). Thus, we propose adopting a policy of responding to points of
metaphysical and practical uncertainty associated with the alignment problem by limiting and choosing necessary as-
sumptions to reduce the risk false positives. Herein we explore in detail some of the relevant points of uncertainty that
AGI alignment research hinges on and consider how to reduce false positives in response to them.
Introduction
The development of artificial intelligence (AI) is making possible many technological advance-
ments and improvements to wellbeing but also exposes humans to considerable risks (Brundage et al.,
2018). Key among these risks are the existential risks associated with artificial general intelligence
or AGI (Turchin and Denkenberger, 2018). In particular, it is likely that the development of super-
intelligent AGI will create either existential catastrophe or massive benefits for humanity with little
room for mildly bad, mildly good, or neutral outcomes (Bostrom, 2014). This bimodal distribution
of outcomes where one of the outcomes is extremely undesirable implies that we are better off if
we focus more on avoiding negative outcomes and less on achieving positive outcomes (Bostrom,
2003). Thus, assuming AGI will be built eventually, we can increase the expected value of AGI
by working on interventions that reduce the chance of existential catastrophe, and we call the field
that focuses on these interventions AI safety (Yampolskiy, 2012).
Central among interventions that address AI safety is alignment, the problem of how to build AGI
that is aligned with human interests (Soares and Fallenstein, 2017). The alignment problem is
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complex and likely requires solving many open problems in mathematics, economics, computer
science, and philosophy (Yudkowsky, 2016). This is unfortunate from the perspective of increasing
the expected value of AGI by reducing existential risks because it introduces many opportunities
for researchers to make mistakes. If those mistakes are false negatives, like believing an alignment
scheme won’t work when it would, then there is a comparatively small loss of value from failing
to develop safe AGI as soon as possible, but if those mistakes are false positives, like believing an
alignment scheme will work when it won’t, then there is an astronomically large loss of value from
accidentally developing unsafe AGI. This implies that, all else equal, we are better off preferring
false negatives to false positives when working on alignment.
This preference suggests several AGI research and development policies. One previously explored
by Yudkowsky is the idea of security mindset, borrowing an idea of the same name from computer
security researcher Bruce Schneier, which we might summarize as the expectation of operating
in an adversarial environment that is actively trying to produce unsafe AGI (Yudkowsky, 2017b).
Another, which we will explore here, might be called robustness to fundamental uncertainty, the
idea that we can reduce false positives by choosing necessary assumptions when reasoning about
alignment such that the chosen assumptions minimize the risk of false positives among the space
of alternative assumptions.
Reducing false positive risk
If we wish to reduce false positives in AI alignment research, viz. reduce the chance of acciden-
tally producing unaligned AGI when we thought we would have produced aligned AGI, we can
work to reduce the overall rate of errors or we can tradeoff producing more false negatives against
producing fewer false positives (Neyman and Pearson, 1933). The former is hard to control since
it largely depends on the base error rates of individual researchers, but the the tradeoff between
false negatives and false positives may be adjusted by taking actions that prefer one to the other.
For example, to decrease false negatives and increase false positives researchers might try more
ideas they think less likely to work and vice versa to increase false negatives and decrease false
positives. The latter is the sort of approach to reducing false positives one might get in part by
application of Yudkowsky’s ideas around security mindset.
Another approach to reducing the rate of false positives by trading off against false negatives is to
apply the principle of parsimony (also known as Occam’s razor) to decrease the probability of any
particular attempt at producing aligned AGI failing by reducing the number of variables multiplied
together in calculating the probability of success (Pearl, 2000). For example, suppose we have
two alignment methods, A and B, and the probability of A producing aligned AGI depends on
the outcome of 5 variables and B depends on the outcome of 4, then all else equal we should
expect B to be more likely than A to produce aligned AGI. On the one hand this suggests the
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adoption of the well-known engineering principle that simpler systems are less likely to fail, and
on the other suggests we can reduce false positives by making a deep commitment to reducing the
number of variables, especially implicit variables that are often ignored, when building aligned
AGI (Billington and Allan, 1992).
We can reduce the number of variables by eliminating unnecessary variables that take the form
of assumptions—unreliable beliefs—in our reasoning. Consider, if we had a plan to build aligned
AGI that depended on variables X, Y, and Z, but suppose X could be deduced from a simpler
and more likely variable W, then we should replace X with W in our reasoning. Or if Y and
Z could both be deduced from another variable V, then Y and Z should be replaced by V. Such
steps should obviously be taken, but they are of limited effectiveness because they do not nec-
essarily eliminate all variables. One cause of our need to reason with irreducible variables is
computational because complete deductive proofs cannot always be found within reasonable time
bounds (Leike and Hutter, 2015). The other, more pernicious cause of this need is the problem of
epistemic circularity.
Briefly stated, epistemic circularity is the problem that nothing can be reliably known without first
knowing something reliably (Alston, 1986). There have been numerous attempts to solve epistemic
circularity since it was first identified by Pyrrhonian skeptics in ancient Greece through the prob-
lem of the criterion, and it remains a key problem in epistemology today because it likely has no
complete solution (Lammenranta, 2003). Instead we are left to adopt the least-bad pragmatic so-
lution, known as particularism, by choosing to assume unreliable entitlements to some knowledge
and then reasoning as if we knew those facts reliably (Chisholm, 1973), (Alston, 1993), (Alston,
2005). This does not fundamentally address the skepticism that epistemic circularity implies, but
it does allow us to contain our skepticism to only a few philosophical assumptions—called hinge
propositions by Wittgenstein, analogous to axioms in formal logics, and related to approximation
of the universal prior in Solomonoff induction—to get on with reasoning in spite of epistemic
circularity (Talvinen, 2009).
Adopting particularism still leaves us with the problem of choosing the specific assumptions upon
which we will build our reasoning about how to build aligned AGI. Since these choices cannot
be made reliably they stand as “free” variable in our reasoning that we must choose using criteria
other than likelihood of being true since that likelihood cannot be adequately assessed. This need
to choose gives us an opening, though, to choose such that the risk of false positives is reduced by
considering the relative likelihood of false positives given different choices of assumptions. We
will now review some of these philosophical assumptions, why they are necessary, and evaluate
their expected impacts on the likelihood of false positives.
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Necessary assumptions
We have identified at least two problems, both metaphysical and pragmatic, that presently require
making assumptions when reasoning about AGI alignment: meta-ethical uncertainty and uncer-
tainty about mental phenomena . For each problem we consider why making an assumption is
necessary and give arguments in favor of and against particular assumptions in terms of their im-
pact on false positives and likelihood of success.
Meta-ethical uncertainty
AGI alignment is typically phrased in terms of aligning AGI with human interests, but this hides
some of the complexity of the problem behind determining what “human interests” are. Taking
“interests” as a synonym for the cluster of concepts we also call “values” and “preferences”, we
can begin to make some progress by treating alignment as at least partially the problem of teaching
AGI to learn human values (Soares, 2016), (Arnold et al., 2017). Unfortunately, what constitutes
human values is currently unclear since humans may not be aware of the extent of their own values
and may not hold reflexively consistent or rational values (Scanlon, 2003), (Tversky, 1969). This
creates a problem in terms of alignment because the values of individual humans, let alone the
combined values of humanity, contradict each other, so in order for an AGI to align its behavior
with human values it must have some way of resolving those conflicts (Yudkowsky, 2004). Re-
gardless of the value conflict resolution mechanism used, having a way to resolve value conflicts
amounts to making a normative decision about values, and doing so means alignment asks us to
tackle the ethical issue of normative uncertainty (MacAskill, 2014).
Normative uncertainty is a symptom of deeper uncertainty in ethics caused by meta-ethical un-
certainty about the existence of moral facts because the problem of the criterion prevents us from
reliably knowing whether or not moral facts exist, let alone what moral propositions are true if
moral facts exist (Chisholm, 1982). Meta-ethical uncertainty forces us to speculate about moral
facts because knowledge about moral facts, even if it is the knowledge that moral facts do not exist,
is necessary to ground ethical reasoning (Zimmerman, 2010). Thus in order to reason about align-
ment we must consider what hinge proposition to adopt about the existence of moral facts in order
to be able to design AGI that can behave in a manner aligned with conflicting human values. The
standard positions regarding the existence of moral facts are realism, anti-realism, and skepticism
being respectively for, against, and uncertain about their existence, so we’ll consider their effects
on false positives in AGI alignment in turn.
If we suppose realism, then we could build aligned AGI on the presupposition that it could at least
discover moral facts even if no moral facts were specified in advance and then use knowledge
of these facts to resolve conflicts in human values. Now suppose this assumption is false and
that moral facts do not exist or even if they do exist they cannot be known, then our moral-facts-
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assuming AGI would either never discover any moral facts to guide its behavior when human
values are in conflict or would assume arbitrary moral propositions to be facts that would not
be sure to produce resolutions to value conflicts that humans would want. Such an AGI might
still achieve de facto alignment with human values if it adopted moral propositions it believed to
be facts that allowed it to converge on a functionally equivalent solution to the one an AGI that
had correctly assumed no knowledge of moral facts would have used, but lacking an argument
suggesting such an AGI would be less likely to result in false positives than a simpler AGI that
started out not assuming knowledge of moral facts this seems a strictly more risky approach.
If we suppose anti-realism, then we must build aligned AGI to reason about conflicts in human
values in the absence of any normative assumptions grounded in moral facts. Now suppose this
assumption is false and moral facts do exist, then our moral-facts-denying AGI would resolve
value conflicts in a way not based on moral facts and would fail to act in a way that fully satisfied
human preferences for ethical behavior. Such an AGI might still achieve de facto alignment with
human values if it adopted conflict resolution mechanisms that were functionally equivalent to
those it would have adopted if it had known moral facts, and it may be able to do this because the
unacknowledged moral facts would impact such an AGI through their influence on human values.
Although less efficient than acting on moral facts directly, this suggests an anti-realist AGI could
still stand a chance of aligning itself based on moral facts as revealed by the human values being
aligned with.
If we suppose skepticism, then we must build aligned AGI in the absence of any knowledge of
moral facts, which is similar to the anti-realist case, but different in that there we assume moral
facts do not exist where here we remain open to the possibility that moral facts may exist even
if we don’t or can’t know them. Now suppose this assumption is false and we can know about
the existence of moral facts such that we could decide in favor of realism or anti-realism, then the
AGI may fail to acknowledge and use this knowledge to make more informed decision about value
conflict resolution, however we could reasonably expect this to be mitigated because skepticism,
unlike realism and anti-realism, need not assume a strong metaphysical claim and only instead
claim that perfect knowledge is not possible, thus the skeptical AGI could switch to believing
realism or anti-realism with high credence and acting on that belief. This still leaves open the
practical question of how a skeptical AGI would address value conflicts, but it could reasonably
either choose norms the same way an anti-realist AGI would until it learned more, or it could adopt
moral particularism to ground its norms on moral assumptions.
The result of this analysis is that it is probably best to adopt moral skepticism to reduce the risk of
false positives when building aligned AGI. Although it may be a much less direct route to aligned
AGI than assuming realism would be if realism were true and a slightly less direct route than as-
suming anti-realism if anti-realism were true, skepticism allows AGI research to avoid committing
to a hinge proposition that will much raise the risk of false positives. This unfortunately makes
solving alignment harder because it eliminates the opportunity to ground choices about value con-
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flict resolution norms in thoroughly grounded moral reasoning, but it would still be possible to
make progress by adopting norm particularism (after the style of Dancy’s ethical particularism)
despite not being able to make truth claims about which norms are best (Dancy, 1983). A direction
of future research could include evaluating norms that might be adopted in the same way we are
here evaluating hinge propositions to minimize the likelihood of false positives.
Uncertainty about mental phenomena
Since AGI alignment is necessarily alignment of AGI, alignment schemes can depend on the dis-
positions of AGI, and one disposition AGI has is to subjective experience and mental phenom-
ena (Adeofe, 1997), (Nagel, 1974). Whether or not we expect AGI to realize this disposition
matters because it influences the types of alignment schemes that can be considered since an AGI
without a mental aspect can only be influenced by modifying its algorithms and manipulating its
behavior whereas an AGI with a mind can be influenced by engaging with its perceptions and
understanding of the world (Dreyfus, 1978). In other words we might say mindless AGI can be
aligned only by algorithmic and behavioral methods whereas mindful AGI can also be aligned by
philosophical methods that work on its epistemology, ontology, and axiology (Brentano, 1995).
It’s unclear what we should expect about the mentality of future AGI, though, because we are
presently uncertain abut mental phenomena in general (cf. the work of Chalmers and Searle for
modern, popular, and opposing views on the topic), so we are forced to speculate about mental
phenomena in AGI when we reason about alignment (Chalmers, 1996), (Searle, 1984).
Note, though, that this uncertainty may not be fundamental (Dennett, 1991). For example, if ma-
terialist or functionalist attempts to explain mental phenomena prove adequate, perhaps because
they lead to the development of conscious AGI, then we may agree on what mental phenom-
ena are and how they work (Oizumi et al., 2014). If they don’t, though, we’ll likely be left with
metaphysical uncertainty around mental phenomena that’s rooted in the epistemic limitations of
perception (Hussrl, 2014). Regardless of how uncertainty about mental phenomena might later be
resolved, it currently creates a need for pragmatically making assumptions about it in our reason-
ing about alignment. In particular we want to know whether or not we should design alignment
schemes that assume a mind, even if we expect mental phenomena to be reducible to other phe-
nomena. Given that we remain uncertain and cannot dismiss the possibility of mindful AGI, what
we decide depends on how likely alignment schemes are to succeed and avoid false positives con-
ditional on AGI having the capacity for mental phenomena. The choice is then between whether
we design alignment schemes that work without reference to mind or whether they engage with it.
If we suppose AGI do not have minds, whether because we believe they have none, are inacces-
sible to us, or not causally relevant to alignment, then alignment schemes can only address the
algorithms and behavior of AGI. Now suppose this assumption is false and AGI do have minds,
then our alignment schemes that work only on algorithms and behavior would be expected to con-
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tinue to work since they function without regard to the mental phenomena of AGI, making the
minds of AGI irrelevant to alignment. This suggests there is little risk of false positives from
supposing AGI do not have minds.
If we suppose AGI do have minds, then alignment schemes can also use philosophical methods to
address the values, goals, models, and behaviors of AGI. Such schemes would likely take the form
of ensuring that updates to an AGI’s ontology and axiology converge on and maintain alignment
with human interests (de Blanc, 2011), (Armstrong, 2015). Now suppose this assumption is false
and AGI do not have minds, then our alignment schemes that employ philosophical methods will
likely fail because they are attempting to address mechanisms of action not present in AGI. This
suggests there is a risk of false positives from supposing AGI have minds proportionate with the
likelihood that we do not build mindful AGI.
From this analysis it seems we should suppose mindless AGI when designing alignment schemes
so as to reduce the risk of false positives, but note that it does not consider the likelihood of success
at aligning AGI using only algorithmic and behavioral methods. That is, all else may not be equal
between these two assumptions such that the one with the lower risk of false positives might not
be the better choice if we have additional information that leads us to believe that alignment of
mindful AGI is much more likely to succeed than the alignment of mindless AGI, and it appears
that we have such information in the form of Goodhart’s curse and the failure of good old-fashioned
AI (GOFAI).
Goodhart’s curse says that when optimizing for the measure of a value the optimization process will
implicitly maximize divergence of the measure from the value (Yudkowsky, 2017a). This is an ob-
servation that follows from the combination of Goodhart’s law and the optimizer’s curse (Goodhart,
1984), (Smith and Winkler, 2006). The tendency of measure and value to diverge under opti-
mization results in a phenomenon known as “Goodharting”, and it takes myriad forms that affect
alignment (Manheim and Garrabrant, 2018). In particular Goodharting poses a problem for behav-
ioral alignment schemes because to optimize behavior it is necessarily to measure behavior and
then optimize on that measure. Consequently it appears behavioral methods are unlikely to be
capable of producing aligned AGI on their own, and this is further supported by both the histor-
ical failure to align humans with arbitrary values using behavioral optimization methods and the
widespread presence of Goodharting in behaviorally controlled, evolving computer systems (Scott,
1999), (Lehman et al., 2018).
Further, past research on GOFAI—AI systems based on symbol manipulation—suggests algo-
rithmic methods of alignment are likely to be too complex to work for the same reasons that
GOFAI was itself unworkable, namely that it proved infeasible for humans to program systems
with enough complexity and specificity to do anything more than perform meaningless manipu-
lations (Haugeland, 1985), (Agre, 1997). In recent years AI researchers have surpassed GOFAI
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only by switching to designs where humans specify relatively simple computations to be per-
formed and allow the AI to apply what Moravec called “raw power” to large data sets to achieve
results (Russell and Norvig, 2009), (Moravec, 1976). This suggests that attempts to align AGI by
algorithmic means are likely to also prove too complex for humans to solve, leaving us with only
philosophical methods of alignment and thus necessitating mindful AGI.
This paints a bleak picture for the possibility of aligning mindless AGI since behavioral methods
of alignment are likely to result in divergence from human values and algorithmic methods are too
complex for us to succeed at implementing. This leads us to conclude that, although assuming
mindful AGI has a greater risk of false positives than assuming mindless AGI all else equal, all
else is not equal, mindless AGI is less likely to be successfully aligned because algorithmic and
behavioral alignment mechanisms are unlikely to work, so we have no choice but to take on the
risks associated with assuming mindful AGI when designing alignment schemes.
Conclusion
Based on the analysis of the previous section, we recommend AGI alignment researchers adopt
moral skepticism with norm particularism and assume AGI will have minds to reduce the risk of
false positives and increase the chance of success at alignment. These are not necessarily all the
assumptions that must be made, but they are at least some that must be, and additional evidence
and arguments may lead us to conclude that a different bundle of assumptions are better responses
to the metaphysical and practical points of uncertainty that forced us to make assumptions. Future
research should consider additional points of uncertainty that demand we make assumptions about
AGI alignment to better understand the distribution of alignment schemes that are likely to result
in acceptable outcomes for humanity.
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